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DID THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
REPEAL THE FIRST?
Jed Rubenfeld*

To get right to the point: Mr. Hacker does not disagree that the
Establishment Clause would, in the absence of the Fourteenth
Amendment, have prohibited Congress from passing a nationwide
religion law like RFRA. He believes, however, that the Fourteenth
Amendment has in part repealed the First.
Of course, he doesn't want to say repealed. The language of re
peal is not pleasant to the ears of those who would like to forget
about First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism. The Four
teenth Amendment did not "repeal any aspect of the text of the
[Establishment] Clause," Hacker says, but only "change[d] pro
foundly the meaning of [its] words."1 If, however, statute A means
x and y, and statute B (enacted later) provides "x shall no longer be
the law of the land," it makes no difference whether we say that B
partially repealed A or merely "changed profoundly the meaning of
[its] words."2 If, moreover, B does not expressly provide that x
shall no longer be the law of the land-if, rather, there is merely a
debated question of whether B should be so interpreted-then the
question, for good or ill, is whether to read B as having partially
repealed A.
Dodging the word repeal, in other words, does not alter the
question. No one had ever supposed that the Fourteenth Amend
ment rescinded any of the foundational prohibitions laid upon Con
gress in the First through Eighth Amendments. Until now - for
this is just what Mr. Hacker says the Fourteenth Amendment did.
Of course, it is possible to read the Fourteenth Amendment this
way, but Mr. Hacker's arguments in defense of this position would
have been far stronger if he had better appreciated the principles of
religious liberty underlying -both in 1789 and in the present day
-the Establishment Clause.
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1. Jonathan D. Hacker, A Response to Professor Rubenfeld, 96 MICH. L. Rav. 2129, 2137
(1998).
2. See id.
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ANTIDISESTABLISHMENTARIANISM

THEN

The basic premise of Mr. Hacker's argument is an injustice he
does to the First Amendment. As to the twofold core meaning of
the Establishment Clause, there is no serious disagreement. The
Clause prevented Congress both from establishing a national reli
gion and from interfering with certain local religion laws, defended
by their champions in the name of religious freedom but con
demned by their detractors as establishments.3 The paradigm case
here was the ecclesiastical system common throughout New Eng
land, where each town was permitted to install by majority vote a
Protestant ministry to be supported by tax revenues (with exemp
tions provided for some dissidents).4 This second aspect of the Es
tablishment Clause, prohibiting Congress from interfering with
local pro-religion laws, is its antidisestablishmentarian component.
Mr. Hacker evidently derived from the historical sections of my
article a very disparaging view of First Amendment antidisestab
lishmentarianism. He does not see in it any principle, not even a
debatable principle, of religious liberty. Instead, the Establishment
Clause, in its antidisestablishmentarian aspect, was merely a "sop
thrown to" the unprincipled New England states. 5
"[A]ntidisestablishmentarianism became part of the First Amend
ment as a result of parochial Realpolitik and not a debate over the
meaning and content of religious liberty."6
Now, if we are dealing with a mere "sop," with mere ''parochial
realpolitik," then of course we know in advance how a court should
decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment repealed First Amend
ment antidisestablishmentarianism. For if the battle is between
America's constitutional principles of religious liberty on the one
hand and mere politicians on the other, who can doubt the
outcome?
But this "parochial" view of the Establishment Clause is pure
anachronism. Today, of course, the New England system seems
scandalous. How can it be that New England, the very birthplace of
American religious liberty, had in 1789 laws that strike us as obvi
ous and reprehensible establishments of religion? We are not
taught about such laws. We are not taught that the First Amend
ment was centrally intended to protect them. We know nothing
3. For a fuller discussion, see Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA
Really Was Unconstitutional, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2347, 2351-56 (1997).
4. See id. at 2352-54.
5. Hacker, supra note 1, at 2132.
6. Id. at 2135.
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about First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism, and when
we first hear of it, our instinct is to find it unprincipled, of no pres
ent use or value, and certainly no part of the present Constitution.
But it does great injustice to our history and to the Constitution
itself to try to sever First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism
from America's "debate over the meaning and content of religious
liberty."7 Religious tyranny, for early Americans, was exemplified
by the Church of England-or more ghastly still, by Popery - in
which a central government dictated to everyone the terms of
Christian worship. New Englanders had fought against the Church
at tremendous cost, and what they had fought for was the right of a
community of protesting believers to live by their own lights.
The word community is central here. For many Americans to
day, religious freedom is a wholly individual matter, an affair of
private conscience. But New Englanders had fought bitterly for the
right of religious communities to flourish freely, for the right of
communities of believers to decide for themselves how to worship
God without being subject to the religious dictates of a centralized
government. (Think of the Amish for a contemporary example.)
This was the "meaning and content" of the town-by-town religious
system New England maintained. Most New Englanders vigorously
denied that this system represented an establishment of religion.
They thought of it as the achievement of religious liberty. And they
had no intention of giving it up. As John Adams is reported to have
said, "We might as well expect a change in the solar syst[e]m, as to
expect they would give up their" local-autonomy church system.8
First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism was, therefore,
every bit as much a part of the Revolutionary fight for religious
freedom as was First Amendment anti-establishmentarianism. The
point of First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism was to pre
vent the new national government from interfering with local sys
tems of religious liberty that -in their supporters' eyes - did not
violate free exercise, that did not establish religion, but that Con
gress might seek, following the powerful Virginia legislature,9 to
abolish.
In this way, prohibiting Congress from violating free exercise,
from establishing religion, and from interfering with local pro-reli7. Id. at 2135.
8. IsAAc BACKUS, Diary 1774, in 2 THE DIARY OF IsAAc BACKUS 895, 917 (William G.
McLoughlin ed., 1979) (quoting John Adams).
9. See Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 2352 n.30 (discussing Jefferson's bill "for Establishing
Religious Freedom").
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gion laws, the First Amendment effectively guaranteed what the
Federalists had said was already implicit in the Constitution: that
"[t]here is not a shadow of right in the general government to inter
meddle with religion."10 Actually, this Madisonian formulation was
probably too extreme (for in exclusively federal domains - for ex
ample, in regulating the sessions of Congress or in prescribing laws
for the territories - the Constitution may have left Congress free
to support religious practices), but the First Amendment undoubt
edly erected a great wall of separation between Congress and reli
gion. This wall of separation was maintained by two different but
equally important buttresses: Congress could neither dictate reli
gion directly to individuals nor dictate it indirectly by telling state
or local communities what their religion laws would have to be.

RFRA fundamentally breached this wall. It was an effort by
Congress to dictate for the entire nation Congress's own definition
of the terms of religious neutrality. Did the Fourteenth Amend
ment empower Congress to do what the First Amendment founda
tionally forbids? This question cannot be answered by dismissing
the Establishment Clause as a "sop," as mere "parochial realpoli
tik." It can be answered only after recognizing forthrightly that
preventing Congress from dictating religion - even if Congress
was dictating what it believed to be true religious neutrality - to
state and local communities was one of the foundational principles
committed to writing in the Bill of Rights. It can be answered only
by appreciating the true significance of the Establishment Clause's
wall of separation for America's constitutional principles of reli
gious freedom.
II.

ANTIDISESTABLISHMENTARIANISM Now

With these considerations in mind, I do not think we can answer
the question the way Mr. Hacker would like. Tb,ere is, first of all,
the very considerable burden of proof that ought to be borne by
someone claiming that one of the prohibitions laid upon Congress
by the Bill of Rights has been done away with by implication.11 In
order for a court to conclude that a subsequent constitutional
amendment has partially repealed any portion of the Bill of Rights,
there ought to be a clear textual statement to that effect. Failing
that, the later enactment should possess an unambiguous core
10. James Madison, General Defense of the Constitution (June 12, 1788), reprinted in 11
THE PAPERS OF J AMES MADISON 129, 130 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977).
11. See Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 2374-76.
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Nowhere

does

Hacker confront this problem.
Nor does Hacker confront the genuine threat posed even today
by obliterating First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism. A
Congress with the power to dictate rules of religious neutrality for
all state and local communities is a Congress empowered to inter
cede directly into the most private, fundamental domains of reli
gious life. This is what RFRA's supporters never understood. Such
a Congress could easily decide that current marriage law is too
closely allied with majority religious traditions. Had Boerne12 come
out the other way, what would RFRA's supporters have said if
Congress later used its expansive Section 5 powers to legislate a
Marital Freedom Act, requiring states to permit any person to
marry any number of other persons?
Certainly it may be said that the Court's decision in Boerne has
avoided this result without necessitating any Establishment Clause
inquiry. Maybe so. But my essay was written to show that laws like
RFRA are unconstitutional period - because they violate the Es
tablishment Clause - no matter how broadly Section 5 or any con
gressional-power-granting provision of the Constitution is read.
Perhaps the "proportionality" test laid out in Boerne13 will prove
elastic. Perhaps a revised RFRA would pass muster under the
Commerce Clause.14

Or perhaps the best reading of Section 5

would give Congress considerable authority to impose on the states
duties beyond those judicially deemed to be constitutionally man
dated. My point is that whatever the scope of Section 5 - or the
commerce clause - may ultimately prove to be as a general matter,
Congress's power to intervene in religious matters is subject to spe
cial, independent restrictions. Those restrictions were laid down in
the First Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment did not re
peal them.
Thanks to the Fourteenth Amendment, states can no longer es
tablish religion. But it is a misjudgment to suppose that this guar
antee makes F irst Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism
irrelevant.

For

the

antidisestablishmentarian

principle

never

merely prevented Congress from abolishing state laws that were
constitutionally deemed, or judicially deemed, to be religious estab
lishments. It prevented Congress from deciding for the nation what
12. City of Boerne

v.

Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).

13. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164, 2169.
14. See Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 2348-49.
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state laws excessively favor or disfavor any religion. Despite the
Fourteenth Amendment, states must and may deal in all sorts of
ways with religion, favoring some religious traditions or disfavoring
them, so long as they neither establish nor prohibit free exercise.
Current marriage law furnishes an excellent example. State em
ployers making Christmas a holiday supply another. State family
law, giving parents the right to inculcate into their children a partic
ular religion, provides yet another.

Congress cannot, under the

First Amendment, intermeddle with

these

laws

on

religious

grounds.
Through RFRA, Congress attempted to impose upon all state
and local law a national definition of the appropriate terms of reli
gious neutrality.

Congress may not pass such a statute without

breaching the wall of separation between itself and religion erected
by the First Amendment - a wall the Fourteenth Amendment
gives us no reason to tear down and every reason to maintain.

